Antitrust: A Collage of Vertical Territorial Restraints, Tying and Monopoly Misuse Arbitrability and the General Dynamics Defense by Lee, Mark R.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 1 Article 2 
April 1979 
Antitrust: A Collage of Vertical Territorial Restraints, Tying and 
Monopoly Misuse Arbitrability and the General Dynamics Defense 
Mark R. Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark R. Lee, Antitrust: A Collage of Vertical Territorial Restraints, Tying and Monopoly Misuse Arbitrability 
and the General Dynamics Defense , 55 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1 (1979). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol55/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
ANTITRUST: A COLLAGE OF VERTICAL TERRITORIAL
RESTRAINTS, TYING AND MONOPOLY "MISUSE,"
ARBITRABILITY, AND THE GENERAL
DYNAMICS DEFENSE
MARK R. LEE*
During the 1977-78 term, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit dealt with the problems of vertical territorial re-
straints, tying and monopoly "misuse," the arbitrability of antitrust
claims, and mergers. The only common thread running through the
four major antitrust decisions rendered was a fairly literalistic jurispru-
dence which apparently led the court to both rational and irrational
results.
VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS: THE SCOPE OF CONTINENTAL
T V, INC v. GTE SYLVANIA INCI
A garden-variety business dispute between supplier and distribu-
tor, brought to trial2 in the form of a Schwinn3-style antitrust claim,4
presented the Seventh Circuit with the task of interpreting the United
States Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the legality of vertical
territorial restraints, 5 Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.6 Ad-
hering to both the language and logic of Continental T V., in which the
Supreme Court overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,7 the
Seventh Circuit, in General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery,
8
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University Law School; J.D., University of
Texas; B.A., Yale University; Former staff attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department
of Justice; Former Assistant Attorney General, State of Texas; Member, Texas Bar.
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. The original complaint was filed during April 1972, in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Trial on the amended complaint proceeded in August 1976,
before Judge John W. Reynolds. 568 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1978).
3. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled in Continental
TN., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4. The three-pronged amended complaint also alleged breach of contract (Count I) and
violations of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (1970)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (1976)) (Count III). 568 F.2d at 1150.
5. A vertical territorial restraint is a restriction on the geographical area in which a firm at
one level in the distribution chain (e.g., a wholesaler) can do business. It is imposed on the firm
by a firm at a preceding level (e.g., a manufacturer). See Bosx, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 288
(1978).
6. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
8. 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
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ruled that, until proven otherwise, vertical territorial restraints, unac-
companied by resale price maintenance, are not illegal per se.
The Schwinn and Continental T V Decisions
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held per se unlawful
under section 1 of the Sherman Act9 the practice whereby Arnold,
Schwinn & Company restricted the territories within which and the re-
tailers to whom its wholesale' distributors re-sold" its bicycles.12 In
so holding the Court stated, "Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasona-
ble without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine ar-
eas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over it."' 13 Nonetheless, the
Schwinn rule's controversial' 4 life was cut short by the Court's 1977
Continental T V decision.
Continental T V resolved a challenge to Sylvania's requirement
that its franchised retailers sell its television and other home entertain-
ment products only from designated locations. The District Court for
the Northern District of California refused Sylvania's request to in-
struct the jury that its location clause was illegal only if it unreasonably
restrained or suppressed competition. Instead, following Schwinn, it
gave a per se rule instruction:
[I]f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Sylvania en-
tered into a contract, combination or conspiracy with one or more of
its dealers pursuant to which Sylvania exercised dominion or control
over the products sold to the dealer, after having parted with title and
risk to the products, you must find any effort thereafter to restrict
outlets or store locations from which its dealers resold the merchan-
dise which they had purchased from Sylvania to be a violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, regardless of the reasonableness of the
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
10. It would appear, however, that the Court perceived no material distinction between the
restrictions on those selling at wholesale and those selling at retail. In Schwinn the Court stated,
"The principle is, of course, equally applicable to sales to retailers, and the decree should similarly
enjoin the making of any sales to retailers upon any condition, agreement or understanding limit-
ing the retailer's freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the products." 388 U.S. at 378.
11. A different "rule" applied to the identical restrictions on distributors who did not actually
"re-sell" the bicycles, but merely forwarded orders from the retailers to the factory. Distributors
who merely forwarded orders acted essentially as sales agents or manufacturer's representatives.
Territorial and customer restrictions on these "Schwinn Plan" distributors, to whom neither title
nor possession passed, were not illegal per se. 388 U.S. at 380.
12. Id at 379.
13. Id
14. The "Schwin rule" was subjected to unrelenting criticism by the commentators. See,
e.g., articles and comments listed in GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980,
988 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1976). In addition it underwent "interpretive erosion" in the lower courts. See
433 U.S. at 48 n. 14. Justice Fortas' opaque opinion was doubtless the source of analytical diffi-
culty for antitrust students and socratic delight for antitrust professors.
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location restrictions.15
Not surprisingly, the jury found against Sylvania and judgment was
entered accordingly.
Holding that location clauses were not per se illegal, even under
Schwinn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and found that the jury instructions were inconsistent with both
existing case law permitting exclusive dealerships and, ultimately, with
the very purpose of the Sherman Act. 16 To distinguish Schwinn, the
broad language of which seemed applicable, the court analyzed the
practices challenged in each case. It found that Schwinn, a company
enjoying a very large share of the bicycle market, imposed restrictions
which utterly foreclosed its wholesale distributors from selling Schwinn
products to any purchaser located outside its exclusive territory.' 7 Syl-
vania, in contrast, a firm struggling to obtain more than an insignificant
share of the television market,' 8 limited the locations from which its
franchised retailers could make sales, but otherwise permitted them to
compete for any sales that they could make.' 9 Moreover, as a matter
of company practice, Sylvania franchised at least two dealers in the
major markets. 20 The Ninth Circuit found that Schwinn's practices
were much more likely than Sylvania's to have a net anticompetitive
effect. Thus, the court concluded that while the former might be, and
had been, condemned as illegal per se, the latter should be tested under
the rule of reason.
The Supreme Court found the Ninth Circuit's analysis unpersua-
sive but affirmed the appellate court's holding. The Court found that
both Sylvania and Schwinn placed restrictions on their franchisees in
order to reduce intrabrand and promote interbrand competition.
Thus, it concluded that in terms of functional antitrust analysis, the
restrictions were indistinguishable. 2' Nevertheless, the Court affirmed
15. 433 U.S. at 40-41.
16. OTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976). The court
stated, "That purpose is to insure the 'unrestrained interaction of competitive forces' that 'will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.' Id at 988 (citations omitted).
17. Id at 990.
18. It was apparently in response to its declining market share, one or two percent in 1962,
that Sylvania changed from its traditional "saturation" distribution system (manufacturer-distrib-
utor-retailer) to direct dealing by the factory with a limited number of franchised dealers at desig-
nated locations. Three years later, Sylvania found itself with a five percent market share. 537
F.2d at 982-84.
19. Id at 990.
20. Id
21. 433 U.S. at 46. A location clause like Sylvania's could be at least as restrictive of in-
trabrand competition as a territorial restraint like Schwinn's. For example, if Sylvania had lim-
ited its outlets to one franchised dealer in each of the nation's fifty largest cities it would have
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the Ninth Circuit's decision because of the absence of any showing that
non-price "vertical restrictions have or are likely to have a 'pernicious
effect on competition' or that they 'lack. . . any redeeming virtue,' "22
Schwinn notwithstanding. Indeed, the Court suggested that these re-
strictions might be used pro-competitively by a new manufacturing en-
trant to attract competent and aggressive retailers or by an established
manufacturer to overcome the "free rider" obstacle to the retail provi-
sioning of information, display, and repair services.23
General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery
The business dispute between General Beverage Sales Company
and East-Side Winery arose when East-Side Winery, a supplier of
wines and brandies, terminated its exclusive distributor for certain Wis-
consin counties, General Beverage Sales Company. East-Side charged
that General Beverage failed to meet sales quota obligations incurred
as part of the distributorship agreement. General Beverage blamed
East-Side for failing to make timely shipments of the products ordered.
Lured by the prospect of treble-damages and attorneys' fees, 24 General
Beverage filed suit claiming its termination not only breached its con-
tract, but also violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because it was
prompted by a refusal to abide by vertically imposed territorial sales
restrictions.25 The suit proceeded to trial in August 1976, and the jury,
instructed that the territorial sales restrictions were, according to
Schwinn, per se illegal, found that East-Side had violated the antitrust
laws and thereby caused injury to General Beverage's business.26
effectively stifled, given the local nature of television retailing, all competition between them. But
see 433 U.S. at 59-60 (White, J., concurring).
22. 433 U.S. at 58. The Court articulated the classic justification for a per se rule in Northern
Pac#/ Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
23. 433 U.S. at 55.
24. At trial General Beverage obtained a verdict for $500,000 trebled pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
15 (1970) to $1,500,000. 568 F.2d at 1151. The district judge awarded attorneys' fees in the
amount of $127,564.98 for 2,531.3 hours of legal services billed at plaintiffs normal rate of $50 per
hour. Apparently not satisfied, General Beverage moved that East-Side be forced to pay twice
the normal rate, but the motion was denied. General Beverage Sales Co.-Oshkosh v. East-Side
Winery, [19771 1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,283 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 1, 1977), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1147 (7th
Cir. 1978).
25. In addition, General Beverage alleged that East-Side shipped goods more quickly to
competing distributors, as well as favoring them with promotional allowances and services and
facilities, all in violation of sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d),
(e) (1970). 568 F.2d at 1150.
26. The jury was asked, "Did the defendant East-Side Winery violate the antitrust laws of
the United States?" 568 F.2d at 115 1. Since the district judge defined antitrust laws as including
the Robinson-Patman Act, .the jury's affirmative response could not be sustained on the theory
that it was independently supported by East-Side Winery's violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
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East-Side appealed, but before the Seventh Circuit heard the case, the
United States Supreme Court handed down Continental T V.
Recognizing 27 that the court was bound to apply the current law
rather than the law that existed at the time of the trial,28 General Bev-
erage sought to avoid the necessity of a retrial under Continental T V
by arguing that the decision dealt only with location clauses and not
with territorial sales restrictions. 29 The Seventh Circuit was not per-
suaded that Justice Powell's language was so limited. In fact, it found
that he had expressly rejected the very distinction that General Bever-
age urged, stating, "The fact that one restriction was addressed to terri-
tory and the other to customers is irrelevant to functional antitrust
analysis." 3 The judgment, concluded the court of appeals, had to be
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The logic of Continental T V compelled the Seventh Circuit's con-
clusion. In Continental T V, the Supreme Court reached the question
of the continued viability of Schwinn only because it could not find, for
antitrust purposes, a principled basis for distinguishing location clauses
from territorial sales restrictions. Had the Seventh Circuit permitted
location clauses to be tested under the rule of reason but subjected ter-
ritorial sales restrictions to a per se rule, it would have rendered the
Supreme Court's decision mere surplusage, an idle postscript to the
Ninth Circuit's opinion. By refusing to do so the Seventh Circuit
joined almost every other court which has been asked to interpret the
proper scope of Continental T V 31
27. General Beverage did argue that East-Side waived its challenge to the instructions by
failing to object at trial. The court rejected the argument because to do otherwise would (1)
undermine the policy of applying the existing law rather than the law that existed at the time of
the trial, and (2) exceed the purpose of requiring contemporaneous objection which is to permit
the trial judge to correct any errors. 568 F.2d at 1152.
28. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1975). Thorpe v. Housing Auth.,
393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969).
29. General Beverage also argued that Continental T V was not controlling for territorial
restrictions used as part of a resale price maintenance scheme. While conceding that the argu-
ment might reflect a fair reading of the case, the Seventh Circuit found it inapplicable to this case.
568 F.2d at 1153.
30. 433 U.S. at 46.
31. See Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.
1978), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.LW. 3793 (U.S. June 14, 1978) (No. 77-1769). (Defendant
terminated plaintiff's dealership for violating its policy of making sales outside of its territory at
prices below list. Reasoning that defendant's policy was no worse than territorial restrictions
alone, the court reversed the judgment for plaintiff and remanded the cause for a new trial in light
of Continental TV); Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977);
Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 563 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1977); Florida Harvestore,
Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., [19771 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,679 (5th Cir. Oct. 17,
1977); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., [1977] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,776 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 23, 1977) (vacating the injunction issued in Schwinn on remand and approving the vertical
restraints in the company's revised authorized Dealer Agreement); Newberry v. Washington Post
Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977); Lucas Hoist & Equip. Co. v. Eaton Corp., [1978] 1 TRADE
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TYING AND SECTION Two MONOPOLY "MISUSE"
With all the earmarks of a hum-drum dealer cancellation case,
Sargent- Welch Scientlfc Co. v. Ventron Corp.32 hardly seemed the
likely vehicle for potentially limiting the reach of the tying laws or for




Ventron's Cahn Instruments Company developed and manufac-
tured precision weighing devices, "electrobalances," which, utilizing an
electromagnetic weighing principle, balanced a sample's unknown
weight with the force of an electric current. With these instruments, a
sample's weight could be determined with extraordinary accuracy by
comparing the amount of electrical force needed to balance it with the
amounts needed to balance standard weights.34 Cahn electrobalances
varied somewhat in their capacities, modes of operation, types of read-
out, sources of power, and, most significantly for the purposes of this
case, seL sitivities. The least sensitive, a "millibalance" model, mea-
sured accurately to within 100 micrograms; 35 the most sensitive, a
"microbalance" model, was accurate to within 1/20.microgram. 36 In
1971, the year in which Cahn terminated Sargent-Welch's dealership,
Calm sold 141 millibalances and 359 microbalances in the United
States.
37
From the beginning of its operation, Cahn marketed its elec-
trobalances in the United States primarily through dealers like Sargent-
Welch. Sargent-Welch represented, in addition to Cahn, some 3,000
other manufacturers of various types of scientific and laboratory equip-
ment. Its 1970 sales totalled about $60,000,000, of which less than
CAS. (CCH) 62,046 (w.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1977). The only discovered case containing arguably
contrary language is Pitchford Scientfc Instruments Corp. v. Pep, Inc., [1977] 2 TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 61,741 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 1977). In that case, in an opinion manifestly hostile to the
Supreme Court's opinion, the district judge distinguished Continental T V from the case before
him on the ground, among others, that the former dealt only with location clauses.
32. 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert.fled, 46 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. May 1, 1978)
(No. 77-1566).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
34. 567 F.2d at 704 n.l.
35. A microgram is one one-millionth of a gram (.000001 gram); a gram is the weight
equivalent of .035 ounces.
36. Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., [19761 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,146
(N.D. I1. Nov. 1, 1976), aft'd in part, vacated ipart, 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1566). In this article, models having sensitivi-
ties of less than one microgram will be referred to as, microbalances, as they were by the Seventh
Circuit.
37. Id at 70,174.
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$40,000 were attributable to Cahn balances.3 8
In order to "consolidate sales among its more effective dealers,"39
Cahn began to eliminate those with spotty records. 40 Sargent-Welch's
performance suffered, in Cahn's view,4' from decreasing sales,42 failure
to carry millibalances, and inadequate promotion. 43 In April 1971
Cahn cancelled.
The cancellation, according to Sargent-Welch's complaint, con-
travened the antitrust laws in two ways. First, it furthered Cahn's tie
of millibalances to microbalances in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act" and section three of the Clayton Act.45 Second, it con-
stituted, along with its dealer reduction program, an effort by Cahn to
maintain its monopoly in electromagnetic microbalances and to use
that monopoly to enhance the sales of its millibalances in violation of
section two of the Sherman Act.46 After a bench trial in the fall of
1976, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered
judgment for Cahn.47 On the tying claim the district court found not
38. 567 F.2d at 705.
39. Id Apparently Calm predicted that if it limited the number of its dealers, each could
realistically hope to make sufficient sales of Calm balances to justify the expense of technical
training for its salesmen. Presumably, the better trained salesmen would make more sales. Id at
712.
40. Giving explanations similar to the one it gave Sargent-Welch, Cahn cancelled two other
dealers in 1972. Id at 705.
41. In his letter cancelling the Sargent-Welch dealership, Cahn's director of marketing noted
these factors which were purportedly related to the action taken. Id
42. Sargent-Welch's orders of Cahn products fell from $148,000 in 1968 to $68,272 in 1969 to
$39,728 in 1970. Its orders for the first quarter of 1971 were about the same as for the first quarter
of 1970. [1976] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) $ 61,146 at 70,172-73.
43. For example, Cahn's balances were indexed in Sargent-Welch's Catalog 119, described
by Sargent-Welch's president and board chairman as its "most important selling tool," under the
company's name and the terms "balance" and "Electrobalance." The only balances indexed
under the term "Microbalances" were those manufactured by a competitor. Yet the introduction
to Catalog 119 explains to the reader that "each item in the general index is entered by every
probable terminology." (Finding of Fact #25). Id at 70,173.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
46. Sargent-Welch also claimed that Calm cancelled the dealership to enforce its illegal re-
sale price maintenance or "fair trade" program. The district court found that Cahn maintained
prices only in "fair trade" states, a practice then protected by the Miller-Tydings Amendment, Act
of August 17, 1937, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), and the McGuire Act, Act of July 14, 1952, Pub. L. No.
542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952). Only in California, where it competed with its own dealers, did Cahn's
program fall outside the scope of those laws' protection. Even the illegality of the California
program was unavailing to Sargent-Welch, however, for the district court also found that Cahn's
cancellation of the dealership was unrelated to Sargent-Welch's price-cutting. Moreover, the dis-
trict court found that Sargent-Welch failed to prove that it suffered any injury from that program.
The Seventh Circuit, while suggesting that the California program might well have been pro-
tected, upheld the district court's other findings as well-supported by the evidence. 567 F.2d at
706-08.
47. [197612 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 361,146 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1976), aff'd inpart, vacated inpart,




Sargent-Welch "failed to prove that defendant attempted to coerce
plaintiff into handling [its] new products by, for example, threatening
termination," or that Cahn "refused to sell its microbalances to a
dealer who would not handle the millibalance," but also that Cahn
"did not require its dealers to handle the millibalance models as a
condition to continuing to be a dealer."
48
In short, the court found that Cahn did not engage in tying. On the
section two claim, the district court found that Calm enjoyed a
nonmonopolistic 8.2 percent share of the relevant precision balance
product market, did not intend to have the power to monopolize that
market, and had neither obtained nor maintained its position in the
electromagnetic microbalance field by illegal means.49 Sargent-Welch
appealed this district court decision.
Tying
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated
that "[t]o establish a tying arrangement violative of § 1 of the Sherman
Act or of § 3 of the Clayton Act the plaintiff must first prove an agree-
ment or understanding between the seller and buyer conditioning the
seller's sale of one product upon the buyer's purchase of another.
'50
The district court had seemingly found that Calm did not, in fact, con-
dition the sale of its microbalances upon the purchase of its mil-
libalances. Since the appellate court found that this conclusion was
supported by adequate evidence,5' it could have been a routine matter
to affirm the judgment on the tying claim. But antitrust cases, based
on laws of near-constitutional dimension and arising with relative in-
frequency, seem to tempt courts to reject the routine in favor of the
overbroad. The Seventh Circuit did not resist this temptation. The
court went out of its way, through dictum and by necessary implica-
tion, to twice limit the reach of the tying laws.
The "Individual Coercion Doctrine"
Not content with its explanation of the tying offense, the Seventh
Circuit observed that "[c]oercion has [also] been viewed as an essential
element."'52 As pure dictum this observation had no impact on the
Calm/Sargent-Welch dispute, but it may, if followed, place a major
obstacle in the path of plaintiffs in tying cases. For example, a Mc-
48. 567 F.2d at 709.
49. Id at 706.
50. Id at 708.
51. Id at 709.
52. Id at 708.
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Donald's franchisee might know that it is useless or against his ultimate
best interests to overtly resist McDonald's "request" that he buy his
hamburger meat from the franchisor's regional storehouse. If he com-
plained of tying in an antitrust suit, he would experience some diffi-
culty proving that McDonald's conditioned the granting of the
franchise on the purchase of its meat. But having acceded to the "re-
quest," he would have considerably more trouble proving that McDon-
ald's actually "coerced" him into making those meat purchases.
53
Generally, plaintiffs like the hypothetical McDonald's franchisee could
find the burden of distinguishing "coercion" from "persuasion" ex-
tremely onerous.
54
Making litigation more arduous for plaintiffs in tying cases is per-
fectly proper, of course, as long as it is required by or consistent with
the prohibition on tying. Neither the broad formulation of section one
nor the narrow language of section three speaks expressly of coercion.
In interpreting those statutes, the United States Supreme Court has said
that coercion of distributors by suppliers is one of the evils of tying,55
but it has neither held nor suggested that it is one of the elements of the
offense.
56
The "individual coercion doctrine" seems to have had its genesis
in lower court rulings on class certification in suits brought by franchis-
ees against their franchisors.57 Opposing certification under rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,58 the franchisors have
argued that questions of fact common to all class members do not
predominate since each plaintiff must prove that he was "coerced."
The argument has struck a responsive chord in courts which seem to be
troubled by the prospect of awarding treble damages to franchisees
who initially welcomed the opportunity to purchase the allegedly tied
products.
As a limitation on recovery the "doctrine" may make some
53. See generally Austin, The Indfvidual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysis. Confusing and
Irrelevant, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Austin).
54. Cf. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976). (In rejecting a class certification on the ground that each member of the class
would have to show that he or she had been individually coerced, the court admitted that "there
can be no bright line distinguishing influence, persuasion, and aggressive salesmanship on the one
hand from coercion on the other." Id. at 1224. Neither the franchisor's superior economic
power nor its practice of permitting franchisees only thirty days to obtain equipment from a sup-
plier other than the one approved by the franchisor was sufficient to prove that all franchisees
were "coerced.")
55. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
56. Austin, supra note 53, at 1147-49.
57. Eg., Response of Caroline, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976);
Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
58. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(3).
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sense.59 In the usual case, the plaintiff claims that his business or prop-
erty was injured by a tie to the extent that he purchased "unwanted"
tied products. 6° The injury may be rather difficult to verify. It would
seem tautological that the plaintiff, typically a businessman, purchased
the defendant's products because they were worth the asking price.
Distinguishing, then, between the "wanted" and the "unwanted"
purchases may become quite a metaphysical challenge. That chal-
lenge should be met by the plaintiff since he is the one claiming injury
and he is in a better position than the defendant to show what it is that
he "wanted." Requiring proof of "coercion" may be an effective
method of making sure that the plaintiff verifies his injury. Many
courts, however, have not made such limited use of the "doctrine."
6l
Rather, the courts have interpreted the doctrine to require proof of
"coercion" as an element of the offense. This requirement appears to
be inconsistent with both the "anti-leverage" and "anti-discrimination"
rationales of the prohibition on tying. Traditionally, tying was thought
to be an antitrust evil for it supposedly enabled a monopolist to use his
power in one market as a lever in gaining a monopoly in another.
Modem economic scholarship has largely discredited this "leverage"
theory, suggesting instead that tying may be used to facilitate price dis-
crimination.62 Price discrimination itself may be an antitrust evil. As
a revenue-maximizing device, it may attract resources into socially
inefficient efforts to monopolize,63 or it may simply "imply the exist-
ence of power that a free market would not tolerate."'64 Whether the
evil to be avoided is a "levered" monopoly or price discrimination, it
should be of no concern to an antitrust court in deciding the liability
question that the particular plaintiff before it can or cannot prove that
he was "coerced." It is the practice itself, not the plaintiff's state of
59. Cf. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 943 (1976). (Plaintiff-distributor claimed, inter alia, that he lost profits due to defendant-
brewery's practice of placing a ceiling on wholesale prices. The ceiling was allegedly created by
the brewery's instructions to stay competitive with other local or "popular" brands coupled with
its practice of automatically increasing its own selling price by one-half of any increase imposed
by him. Despite the distributor's admission that he would have remained competitive in any
event, the jury returned a verdict in his favor. Reversing, the appellate court suggested that the
distributor could recover damages, if any, only for those lost profits attributable to the brewery's
coercion.)
60. The plaintiff will commonly argue that he purchased tied products which were more
costly than substitutes made by the defendant's competitors or which were simply not used.
61. See the cases collected in Austin, supra note 53, at 1145 n.8.
62. See POSNER, ANIrRUST LAW 171-78 (1976); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Lev-
erage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Director & Levi, Law and the Future.: Trade Regulation, 51
Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1956); Markovits, Te.ins, Recprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J.
1397. (1967).
63. POSNEt, ANTITRUST LAW 176-78 (1976).
64. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U.S. 610, 617 (1977).
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mind, that is arguably dangerous.65
The Seventh Circuit and the federal district courts in Illinois, Indi-
ana, and Wisconsin would do well to narrow the Sargent- Welch "coer-
cion" dictum. It could be construed, for example, to require proof of
"coercion" as an element of the offense only in similar cases, dealer
cancellation suits, in which "coercion" is likely to be at issue in any
event.66 Alternatively, without doing violence to the case or tying law,
one could read the dictum to mean no more than an authorization to
take "coercion" into account in assessing damages.
The Requirement of "Something More Than An Inference?"
Sargent- Welch places still another limitation on the law of tying.
Unfortunately, this second limitation is so metaphysical that it must be
suggested by analysis rather than stated directly. The first step in the
analysis will be to identify the crucial element of the tying offense and
its communication component. That will provide a useful context
within which to examine the Seventh Circuit's opinion. At the close of
the examination, it will only remain to recognize the necessary implica-
tion.
Whatever its vices, the offense of tying is at least well-named. The
name itself clearly identifies the offense's crucial element: conditioning
the sale of one product on the purchase of another. It is the condition
that gives the offense its distinctive character; it is the condition that
supposedly gives rise to untoward effects in the market place.
All would presumably agree that if a tie is to be more than a
seller's wistful daydream, the condition must be communicated to a
buyer. The message might be sent, of course, in any number of ways
and one might imagine them arrayed along a continuum of "express-
ness." At the "most express" end one might find, for example, a
seller's take-it-or-leave-it order form for the purchase of product A
which conditions any sale on the buyer's simultaneous purchase of
product B. Around the middle of the continuum one might find, for
another example, a manufacturer's letter advising a recalcitrant dealer
that since his practice of purchasing product A to the exclusion of prod-
uct B was not only unprecedented, but also disproportionately raised
shipping costs, and "disrupted transactions with other dealers," a re-
evaluation of the existing relationship would be undertaken. And, at
65. Of course, the "individual coercion doctrine" may be an effective but intellectually dis-
honest way of undermining the Supreme Court's "quasi-per se" rule against tying. See Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
66. Austin, supra note 53, at 1165-68.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the "least express" end, one might find for a final example, a supplier's
unpublicized and unexplained practice of cancelling distributorships
which, according to government compiled statistics, placed annual
product B orders amounting to less than seventy-five percent of their
product A orders. The seller's choice of medium for sending his
message may have an impact on the buyer's ability to make his case,
but it is immaterial to the existence of the tie.
In Sargent- Welch the Seventh Circuit failed to distinguish the me-
dium from the message. It mistakenly focused on an agreement or
understanding between seller and buyer, a bilateral contract of sorts, as
the crucial element of tying.67 The court acknowledged that the agree-
ment or understanding might be inferred from the circumstances, 68 but
it held, giving the findings of fact a peculiarly narrow interpretation,
that Sargent-Welch had simply failed to prove one.69 Thus, the offense
had not been established. That did not preclude the possibility, how-
ever, at least in the court's view, that Cahn had "unilaterally us[ed]
monopoly power in microbalances to force unwanted millibalances on
its dealers. '70 Although a potential section two violation, this practice,
according to the court, would not have constituted tying.
This distinction between "agreement or understanding" and "uni-
lateral forcing" does not turn at all on whether the sale of one product
is or is not conditioned on the purchase of another. Rather, it rests
entirely on the manner in which the condition is communicated. On
the one hand, if the condition is stated in so many words or suggested
by the language used under the circumstances, then there is an "agree-
ment or understanding" and, of course, a tie. The seller's order form
and the manufacturer's letter would be examples. On the other hand,
if the condition is communicated by way of conduct and reasonable
inference, there is "unilateral forcing" and no tie. An example might
be the supplier's distributorship cancellation practice. In effect, the
court eliminates the most subtly communicated ties from the reach of
section one and section three.
This limitation is unsound for at least three reasons. First, it does
little more than invite the substitution of subtle for direct communica-
67. 567 F.2d at 708-09.
68. Id at 709.
69. Id At the risk of being repetitious the district court made numerous findings to make it
abundantly clear that Cahn had not conditioned the sale of microbalances on the purchase of
millibalances. [1976] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,146passim (N. D. M11. Nov. 1, 1976), affdin part,
vacated ha par, 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977),pe'tionfor cert.filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. May 1,
1978) (No. 77-1566).
70. Id The court subsequently addressed the question of relevant market and market share.
567 F.2d at 709.
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tion as a means of committing the offense. Second, it is not well-suited
to judicial use for it requires a highly metaphysical inquiry into the
inner process by which a buyer becomes aware of the seller's tie.
Third, it seems to bear no discernible relationship to the policies under-
lying the prohibition against tying.
Section Two 'Abuse of Monopoly"
As the Seventh Circuit limited the reach of the tying laws so it
expanded the scope of section two. According to the court, Cahn's
alleged use of "monopoly power in microbalances to force unwanted
millibalances on its dealers" did not violate the tying laws but could
well have violated section two. Two obstacles to this expansion of sec-
tion two, however, loomed large. One was the district court's finding
that the relevant product market was precision balances. Calm had
only 8.2 percent of that market and it had neither the intent nor the
power to monopolize it. The other was the district court's finding that
Cahn had obtained and maintained its position in electromagnetic
microbalances "due. . . to its patents, its skill and knowledge, and its
aggressiveness.",71
The Relevant Market
A section two claim ultimately calls into question the extent of the
defendant's power, usually the power to raise the price and restrict the
output of a particular good or service. Answering the ultimate ques-
tion directly, however, would be a task of extraordinary complexity.
The task may be simplified by indulging in the reasonable presumption
that the greater the defendant's share of the market, the greater is his
power. Then, the antitrust court may undertake to make two lower
order inquiries. First, what definition of the market will best capture
the play of supply and demand forces which significantly impinge on
the defendant's conduct? Second, what is the defendant's share of that
market? If these instrumental inquiries are undertaken with the ulti-
mate question firmly in mind, their resolution should help answer it.
In the instant case, Sargent-Welch claimed that Cahn had the
power to "force" it and other dealers to purchase millibalances in order
to obtain microbalances. Any such power would have been limited,
naturally, by the dealers' ability to acquire substitute products. To
dealers who ordered microbalances for resale, not end-use, all other
scientific and laboratory equipment may have been substitute products.
71. [1976] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,146 at 70,168.
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That equipment, it could have been argued, consituted the relevant
product market for evaluating Cahn's alleged power.72 Since Cahn's
share of that market must have been negligible, it could have been pre-
sumed that Cahn's power was, too. But apparently the argument was
never made.
Indeed, the district court and the Seventh Circuit inquiries into the
relevant product market were made without consideration of the ulti-
mate power question. Consequently, both courts ignored the econom-
ics of Calm's relationship with its dealers. Instead, each court,
invoking the language of Brown Shoe73 and du Pont,74 focused on the
interchangeability of electromagnetic microbalances and other instru-
ments for the purposes of potential end-users. Potential end-users,
however, were supplied by dealers like Sargent-Welch and were not
"forced" to purchase any Calm product. Thus, the courts' focus
caused their market analyses to be largely beside the point.
75
But even assuming materiality arguendo, the courts' focus also
caused their market analyses to be substantially incomplete. Demand
forces, like the interchangeability of products for particular purposes,
are only one-half of those that shape a market. The other one-half are
supply forces. To be complete, a market analysis must take into ac-
count the forces of both demand and supply. The Tenth Circuit's mar-
ket analysis in Telex Corp. v. IB.M. Corp. ,76 for example, did just that.
Telex claimed that I.B.M. unlawfully monopolized a market which it
defined as peripheral equipment plug-compatible with I.B.M. De-
mand forces supported Telex's definition. Only peripheral equipment
plug-compatible with I.B.M. computers could be used by I.B.M. com-
puter end-users. Nevertheless, the court rejected Telex's definition.
Supply forces supported the rejection. Other manufacturers could
have made their peripheral equipment plug-compatible with I.B.M.
computers with the simple and inexpensive addition of an adaptive "in-
72. Cf. Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v. National Educ. Advertising Serv., Inc., 516 F.2d
1092 (7th Cir. 1975). (In Cars, the court held that the defendant might have market power in the
market for representing college newspapers in the placement of national advertising even though
it did not have market power in the market for publicizing a national advertiser's product or
service to college students. The court stated, "It would ... be possible for a middleman to lack
the requisite market power in one direction while achieving a complete stranglehold in the other
direction." Id at 1099. Similarly, Cahn might have market power in relationship to
microbalance end-users without having market power in relationship to scientific and laboratory
equipment dealers.)
73. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
74. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
75. Clearly, the characteristics of potential end-user demand for electronic microbalances
would bear marginally on Cahn's power with respect to its dealers.
76. 510 F.2d 894, 914-19(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975), overndedin Memorex
Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 555 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1977).
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terface." Taking into account both demand and supply forces, the
Tenth Circuit defined the market as all peripheral equipment. The
Sargent-Welch courts did not profit by the Tenth Circuit's example.
By focusing on the interchangeability of electromagnetic microbalances
with other instruments for the purposes of end-users, both the district
court and the Seventh Circuit failed to take into account supply forces.
Neither court considered the possibility, for example, that several in-
strument manufacturers might have been ready, willing and able to
retool their facilities for the production of electromagnetic
microbalances had Cahn effectively raised its prices by "forcing" deal-
ers who wanted microbalances to purchase millibalances. The courts'
market analyses were, therefore, incomplete.
Although both courts' analyses of interchangeability were largely
beside the point and significantly incomplete, at least the district court's
opinion appears to have been somewhat better rooted in business real-
ity than the Seventh Circuit's. The district court defined the relevant
product market as all precision balances. In support of that definition,
it found that electromagnetic microbalances competed in end-use with
mechanical microbalances, electromagnetic millibalances, and non-
gravimetric devices used instrumentally to generate comparable mea-
surements.77 On appeal, these findings were held clearly erroneous.
78
Mechanical microbalances were considered non-competitive because,
unlike their electromagnetic cousins, they had to be shielded from heat
and vibration, could not be used in a vacuum, and were not designed
for use with a recorder to measure weight changes over time. Electro-
magnetic millibalances were considered ron-competitive because they
were incapable of measurement as accurate as that of microbalances.
Further, non-gravimetric devices were considered non-competitive be-
cause "[tiestimony as to non-gravimetric techniques was largely hypo-
thetical.179  In the Seventh Circuit's view, "an end-user who had
certain applications had little choice but to purchase a[n] [electromag-
netic] microblalance." 80 Accordingly, it redefined the relevant product
market as electromagnetic microbalances. 8'
77. [19761 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,146 at 70,168.
78. 567 F.2d at 709-11.
79. Id at 710.
80. Id at 711.
81. In support of its market definition the court did mention several other factors. One was
that the self-aggrandizing statements made by Calm executives suggested to the court that "Cahn
considered microbalances as a distinct market and itself as the market leader." Id Another fac-
tor consisted of the intertwined observations that "Cahn's pricing structure was unrelated to that
of coarser balances" and that "because of Cahn's preeminence in the microweighing field, the
demand for its microbalances was relatively insensitive to price changes." Id Neither sales puff-
ery nor good quality, however, should define a market.
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These market definitions may be tested for functional value by
how well they reflect the product context in which the potential end-
user makes his choice. The potential end-user here needs to measure
the weight, or another functionally related property, of an object. To
meet that need, the end-user employs one of a variety of instruments,
each of which has its own level of accuracy and its own price tag. The
choice of instrument, it is submitted, must ultimately depend on
whether a given level of accuracy is worth the associated price. For
example, suppose a potential end-user has narrowed his choice to three
Cahn instruments:8 2 (1) the G-2 microbalance which is accurate to 1/20
microgram and costs $5,000; (2) the RG microbalance which is accu-
rate to 1/10 microgram and costs $2,500; and (3) the RH millibalance
which is accurate to 2 micrograms and costs $125. The G-2 is twice as
accurate and, under the stated assumptions, twice the price of the RG;
the RG, in turn, is twenty times as accurate and, under the pricing as-
sumptions, twenty times the price of the RH. The potential end-user
then will predict the amount of additional income which he can gener-
ate over the life of the instrument by making more accurate measure-
ments. If the predicted amount is very great he may choose the G-2; if
it is more moderate, he may choose the RG; and if it is quite small, he
may choose the RH. In any event, the product context in which he
makes his choice seems to include both electromagnetic microbalances
and millibalances. Similar illustrations involving mechanical micro-
balances and non-gravimetric devices would suggest that they, too, are
part of the product context. When the test for functional value is ap-
plied, it seems that the district court's precision balance market defini-
tion is more realistic than the Seventh Circuit's electromagnetic
microbalance market definition.
Monopoly "Misuse"
Once the relevant product market was defined as electromagnetic
microbalances, it was indisputable that Cahn with its ninety percent
share, had a monopoly,83 but that, in and of itself, was not illegal. Sec-
tion two would have been transgressed, of course, had Cahn obtained
or maintained its monopoly by untoward means 84 or used it in an at-
tempt to monopolize the larger precision balance market.8 5 Calm,
82. The sensitivity specifications are based on actual data. [1976] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
61,146 at 70,172. The price of each item has been assumed solely for purposes of illustration.
83. 567 F.2d at 709.
84. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
85. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afdper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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however, had done none of these.86 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
remanded the section two claim on the ground that the district court's
findings did not preclude the possibility that Calm had "misused mo-
nopoly power.
8 7
As authority for the existence of this novel "monopoly misuse"
offense, the court relied on United States v. Griffilth 88 and Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States.89 Its reliance was misplaced for, despite Justice
Dojiglas' colorful and undisciplined opinions, both cases dealt with
standard section two fare. In Grffith the Supreme Court held that a
movie theater circuit which owned the only theater in some towns vio-
lated section two by using that monopoly to gain another in those
towns where its theater faced competition. In Lorain Journal the
Supreme Court held that a newspaper publisher which had had a mo-
nopoly in the mass dissemination of news and advertising prior to the
entry of a competing television station violated section two when it
tried to re-obtain or maintain that monopoly by organizing and enforc-
ing an advertising boycott of its competitor. Since the Seventh Circuit
found that Calm's conduct did not resemble that of the movie theater
circuit or the newspaper publisher, but might still be illegal, it appears
that the court may have invented a new offense.
The court did little to explain the meaning of its invention. Its
entire explanation consisted of dividing the undefined offense into two
categories of conduct. The first category included "acts . . . which,
because of their tendency to foreclose competitors from access to mar-
kets or customers or some other inherently anticompetitive tendency,
[were] unlawful under § 2 if done by a monopolist." 90  The second
category included other undescribed acts which would be illegal only if
done by a monopolist for unspecified forbidden purposes.
The court's use of its invention was equally unilluminating. Hav-
ing fixed its categories, the court eschewed analysis and merely sought
to classify Calm's dealer reduction program and cancellation of the
Sargent-Welch dealership. Calm's conduct, it thought, fell definitely
without the first category but perhaps within the second. Legality
turned on Calm's purpose9' which would have to be determined by the
86. 567 F.2d at 709, 710 nn.14, 15.
87. Id at 709.
88. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
89. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
90. 567 F.2d at 711-12.
91. The Seventh Circuit seemed to have made too much of Cahn's purpose. Although pur-
pose may be useful in evaluating ambiguous conduct, it generally ought not convert otherwise
legal conduct into that which is illegal. Cf. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Ex-
pansionary Answer to ike Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373, 392-400
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district court on remand. If Cahn had reduced the number of its deal-
ers to improve marketing efficiency92 and cancelled the Sargent-Welch
dealership to eliminate a poor performer, its purposes were permissible.
But if it had engaged in these acts to "further sales of millibalances to
surviving dealers by causing them to fear that unless they handled mil-
libalances they would not be able to buy microbalances," 93 then its pur-
pose was forbidden.
The Seventh Circuit's explanation and use of its invention suggests
that monopoly "misuse," like hardcore pornography, cannot be defined
but the court knows it when the court sees it. This undefined quality
causes the invention to suffer from lack of both predictability and rec-
ognizable relationship to antitrust policy. These defects may be illus-
trated by way of example. Suppose MRL Company, which enjoys a
ninety percent share of the thing-a-majig market, considers diversifica-
tion. Assume its highly aggressive chief executive is intent on making
his firm the leader in the tightly oligopolistic widget market. The exec-
utive plans to use retained monopoly earnings to finance de novo entry
and a heavy promotional campaign featuring television advertising and
massive give-aways. The executive asks his general counsel to review
the plan for antitrust compliance. Sargent- Welch would not provide
the general counsel with any way of gauging what the executive could
do or even what the executive could wish to do. Conduct could be
illegal because of its "inherently anticompetitive tendency" or because
one of its animating purposes is forbidden. The general counsel will
have to advise the executive that if the plan is put into effect, it may be
challenged as monopoly "misuse" and that the likelihood of a guilty
verdict cannot be predicted. After obtaining this advice, the executive
could well decide that the risk of treble-damages, albeit uncertain, out-
weighs the probable gains of diversification. He might, therefore, scut-
tle his plan to the great detriment of widget consumers who should
have been among the principal beneficiaries of any application of the
antitrust laws.
The monopoly "misuse" offense does seem tailor-made for limit-
ing "unfair" business conduct or "correcting" the inequality of eco-
nomic advantage in the marketplace. Pursuit of these goals, however,
is of doubtful desirability. It could weaken competitive discipline and
(1974) (hereinafter cited as Cooper). (Prof. Cooper suggests that for cases involving attempts to
monopolize, the courts should re-define "specific intent," and recognize that the central task is to
evaluate the alleged conduct.)
92. See note 39 supra.
93. 567 F.2d at 713.
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create disincentives to efficiency. 94 Ultimately, non-optimal resource
allocation could result. More importantly, pursuit of these goals
would be inconsistent with the application of antitrust laws.
The Seventh Circuit's invention is seriously defective. Accord-
ingly, its use should be restricted95 or banned.
NON-ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST CONTROVERSIES
Relationships between many business firms are governed by con-
tracts containing a clause which requires all disputes to be submitted to
arbitration. Yet, when one of these relationships ruptures, one firm is
all too likely to bring suit, despite the clause, charging the other with
violations of the antitrust laws as well as with more routine misdeeds.
In Applied Digital Technology, Inc. (Adtech) v. Continental Casualty
Co. 96 the Seventh Circuit decided that an antitrust complainant may
indeed avoid arbitration if and to the extent that antitrust issues "per-
meate" the case. In so deciding, it joined in the view of every other
court which has considered the matter.97
Perhaps the unanimity of judicial opinion led the parties to argue
the appeal as if the avoidability of arbitration were a given, the only
question being the degree of "permeation" in this particular case.
98
Perhaps the parties' arguments, in turn, led the court to provide very
little reasoning in support of its decision. In any event, all that it did
provide was the Fifth Circuit's language in Cobb v. Lewis,99 itself large-
ly a paraphrase of the Second Circuit's in American Safety Equipment
Corp. v. J P. Maguire, 1 00 which the court described as an articulation of
94. Cooper, supra note 91 at 435-62. Elsewhere in his otherwise excellent article, Prof.
Cooper advocates the recognition of the misuse of the monopoly power offense. Id. at 403-07.
He would apparently limit the offense, however, to those activities which would have the likely
effect of distorting competition in another market or of permitting the monopolist to more effec-
tively exploit his market power. See also Hawk, Attempts to Monopoize--Spec9Fc Intent as Anti-
trust's Ghost In the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1121, 1127-35, 1156-59 (1973).
95. If monopoly "misuse" were confined to instances of "unilateral forcing" then the sub-
stance, though not the language, of both the law of tying and section two would be the same in the
Seventh Circuit as it is in other courts.
96. 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978).
97. E.g., Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc.,
504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1968).
98. On the "permeation" question, the court held that it was not clearly erroneous for the
district court to find that Adtech had a reasonable chance of success and that the arbitrator would
have difficulty avoiding areas which require determinations critical to the antitrust claims. The
correctness of the court's holding may well be doubted. For reasons suggested in the text, Ad-
tech's antitrust claims appear weak. The area which the court seemed to think the arbitrator
would have difficulty avoiding, Continental's "good faith," seems only tangentially related to anti-
trust.
99. 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
100. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the major underlying considerations. Enumerating these considera-
tions, the Seventh Circuit stated:
The first is the broad range of public interests affected by private
antitrust claims. The Court [in American Safety Equipment Corp.
I. recognized that "[a] claim under the antitrust laws is not merely
a private matter," because private antitrust actions are an integral
part of the effort of the antitrust laws "to promote the national inter-
est in a competitive economy" . . . . The Second Circuit noted that
it is doubtful Congress could have "intended such claims to be re-
solved elsewhere than and in the courts" . . . . The second is the
complexity of the issues and the extensiveness and diversity of the
evidence antitrust cases usually involve. These render antitrust
claims "far better suited to judicial than to arbitration procedures"
... . The third is the questionable propriety of entrusting the deci-
sion of antitrust issues to commercial arbitrators, who "are fre-
quently men drawn for their business expertise," when "it is the
business community generally that is regulated by the antitrust
laws."' 0 '
These considerations, which will be examined seriatim, do not in fact
require the court's decision for they are of limited applicability, dubi-
ous relevance, or questionable validity.
A principal purpose of the antitrust laws is to secure for the con-
suming public the optimal allocation of resources available from vigor-
ous competition. 10 2 Any case arising under those laws might therefore
affect the public interest. But simply because any case has that poten-
tial does not mean that every case realizes it. Antitrust suits are far too
frequently brought by a firm in order to undo the verdict of the market-
place, to protect incumbent management from the threat of takeover, to
invalidate contractual limitations on its business autonomy, or to gain
negotiating leverage in an otherwise ordinary business dispute. The
public interest in such suits is rather minimal. Consider, as examples,
the other major private antitrust cases decided by the Seventh Circuit
during the 1977-78 term. 10 3 Liquor retailers in the Oshkosh, Wiscon-
sin area were probably unmoved by the replacement of General Bever-
age with another exclusive wholesaler as their supplier of East-Side
Winery wines and beers. The sophisticated users of scientific and lab-
oratory equipment were probably indifferent to whether they pur-
chased their Cahn electromagnetic microbalances through Sargent-
Welch's or a rival's catalogue. Surely the consuming public quite
properly ignored both matters entirely. Before an antitrust plaintiff is
101. 576 F.2d at 117.
102. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975).
103. General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978); Sargent-
Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), petitionfor cert. filed, 46
U.S.L.W. 3695, (U.S. May i, 1978) (No. 77-1566).
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permitted to avoid arbitration on the ground that his claim affects the
public interest he ought to show that there are reasons and/or evidence
for believing that it does so. 104
It seems unlikely that Adtech could have made such a showing. It
brought suit against Continental, Sybrandt, Inc., and Lockheed Elec-
tronics Corporation claiming breach of contract and warranty by Con-
tinental, tortious interference with contract by Sybrandt, and antitrust
violations by all three. Continental demanded and commenced arbi-
tration proceedings with respect to the contract claims and Adtech
sought and obtained an injunction against those proceedings. Conti-
nental appealed from the issuance of that injunction. Continental had
been engaged in the business of renting Lockheed computers and
Sybrandt software to insurance agents and agencies. It entered into an
agreement which contained a standard arbitration clause for the sale of
its business, including its supply contracts, to Adtech. Before the sale
was consummated, however, Continental sold out to Sybrandt, which
had obtained its financing from Lockheed. 0 5 According to Continen-
tal the sale was made pursuant to its supply contract with Sybrandt
which granted each party the right of first refusal in the event that the
other wished to sell its interest. According to Adtech the sale was
made pursuant to a conspiracy to "prevent Adtech from acquiring
Continental's business, . . . to prevent Adtech from competing with
Lockheed and Sybrandt,. . . and to monopolize' 6 the rental of com-
puters and computer software to insurance agents and agencies."
1 07
It is difficult to perceive the public interest at stake in Adtech's
suit. Certainly there would be none in the mere identity of the new
corporate owners of Continental absent some adverse effect on compe-
tition like an increase in concentration and the associated likelihood of
tacit collusion or the establishment of a monopoly. It appears unlikely
that the Sybrandt/Lockheed acquisition could have had any such ef-
fect. It was not even alleged that prior to the acquisition Sybrandt or
Lockheed engaged in the business of renting computers and software to
104. Cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). (The Court ordered to arbitra-
tion a claim arising under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976), despite its ruling in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), that a claim arising under the
same statute was non-arbitrable. The Court justified its apparent departure from precedent on
the grounds that considerations of international business and policies embodied in international
law controlled. Although the case might be considered sui generis, it seems to suggest that the
policies actually at stake, not merely the statute under which a claim is pressed, ought to deter-
mine the permissibility of arbitration.)
105. Lockheed had also agreed to indemnify Sybrandt for any liability stemming from the
acquisition.
106. Adtech also accused the three defendants of conspiracy to monopolize.
107. 576 F.2d at 118.
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insurance agents and agencies. 08 How their entry into that business
would adversely affect competition is, at best, shrouded in mystery.
It can hardly be denied that antitrust cases commonly raise com-
plex issues which must be decided on the basis of extensive and diverse
evidence. Why that makes them far better suited to cumbersome judi-
cial than to arbitration procedures is far from clear. The courts have
expressed some concern that arbitration proceedings may not provide
for thorough discovery' 9 and effective appellate review," 0 and per-
haps it was those concerns which moved the Seventh Circuit. If so,
then those concerns could be ameliorated by measures far less drastic
than permitting an antitrust plaintiff to avoid arbitration.
The United States Arbitration Act,"' which grants arbitrators the
power to summon witnesses and compel the production of any book,
record, document or paper which may be deemed material evidence, "1
2
is silent with respect to the availability of discovery devices to parties.
In interpreting the Act, some courts have been reluctant to order the
kind of far-reaching discovery which is characteristic of and arguably
necessary for the prosecution of antitrust claims. "3 Apparently, those
courts feared that such discovery might interfere with the expeditious-
ness of arbitration. In Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docatel Corp., 14
however, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York held
that it had the discretion to compel discovery so long as it did not delay
arbitration.' 15 Extending Bigge Crane, a court could require that par-
ties be permitted full discovery whenever it would order an antitrust
claim to arbitration. Surely that would undercut the pro-arbitration
policies of the Arbitration Act less than permitting an antitrust plaintiff
to avoid arbitration.
The Arbitration Act does not require that a record of arbitration
proceedings be made and the parties to a proceeding frequently wish to
avoid the expense, procedural niceties, and formality associated with
108. Although it was not in issue, it may well be doubted that renting computers and software
to insurance agents and agencies constitutes a meaningful market.
109. Eg., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Cf. Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust
Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1072 (1969) (suggesting a modification in the antitrust arbitration
procedure to include effective techniques assuring plaintiffs of discovery).
110. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
111. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-08 (1976).
112. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
113. Eg., Dickstein v. duPont, 320 F. Supp. 150 (D. Mass. 1970) aft'd, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir.
1971).
114. 371 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
115. The court's decision was at least not inconsistent with, and perhaps was supported by, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 l(a)(3) provides that the federal rules apply only to the
extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in the Arbitration Act. FED. R. CIV. P.
81(a)(3).
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making one. The absence of a record, of course, makes judicial review
of most arbitration proceedings rather ineffective. Ineffective review is
only troublesome, however, if its expected costs exceed its expected
benefits. The costs of ineffective review of arbitrated antitrust claims
might be assessed as prohibitive either because arbitrators are more
likely to make errors in the application of antitrust laws or because the
external losses stemming from misapplication may be high. Even if
that assessment were correct,' 16 a court could alleviate the trouble by
requiring that a full record be made whenever it would order an anti-
trust claim to arbitration." 7 Once again, that would better accommo-
date the Arbitration Act and the antitrust laws than permitting an
antitrust plaintiff to avoid arbitration.
In questioning the propriety of entrusting antitrust claims to the
decisions of commercial arbitrators, the court seems to be suggesting
that the business expertise of the arbitrators creates a bias against anti-
trust enforcement. No factual support for that suggestion was offered
and none could be found. Moreover, there seems little reason to ac-
cept it since businessmen are both antitrust plaintiffs and defendants.
The court's reasoning is further undermined by a well-accepted,
though inapplicable, exception to the avoidability of arbitration by an
antitrust plaintiff.1 8 The exception, recognized by the principal case
upon which the Seventh Circuit relies," 9 is made when the agreement
to arbitrate is entered after the dispute arises. However, this exception
exposes the speciousness of the three major considerations underlying
the Adtech decision, for the timing of the agreement has nothing what-
soever to do with the public interest at stake in, the nature of the issues
and evidence common to, or the impropriety of entrusting to commer-
cial arbitrators the decisions about antitrust controversies.
The courts which have considered the exception seem to believe
that an arbitration agreement entered after, rather than before, a dis-
pute arises is more likely to represent a settlement procedure negotiated
116. That assessment is probably incorrect. Arbitrators, if properly selected, may well be
more expert in the law of antitrust than many, if not most, federal district judges. See Aksen,
Arbitration and Antitrust-Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1097 (1969). Unless the
public interest at stake in a particular antitrust claim is quite high, the external losses stemming
from a misapplication of the antitrust laws are likely to be negligible.
117. In Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972), the court reversed a
remand to arbitration made for the purpose of developing a full record. The rationale for the
decision was that requiring a record would frustrate some of the purposes of arbitration. The
decision is not inconsistent with the suggestion made in the text, however, for it would frustrate
the purposes of arbitration less to require a record than to have no arbitration at all.
118. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209
(2d Cir. 1972).
119. Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
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at arm's length, not one imposed by a powerful adversary.' 20 This sug-
gests that the true rationale for the avoidability of arbitration by anti-
trust plaintiffs may be protection from "overreaching." If that were
the rationale, it would not require the decision reached by the Seventh
Circuit for there is no reason to believe that Adtech was "overreached"
by Continental.
Professor Pitofsky has made two additional arguments for permit-
ting antitrust plaintiffs to avoid arbitration.' 2' Both are rooted in his
laudable concern for deterring would-be antitrust violators. The first
is that decisions of arbitrated antitrust claims would not put the busi-
ness community on notice as to what its members may or may not do
because arbitration decisions are generally not published. This argu-
ment is unpersuasive because it is at once too broad and too narrow. It
is too broad for it applies equally to non-antitrust arbitrations. It is too
narrow for it only suggests that courts require published decisions
when they order antitrust claims to arbitration. The second argument
is a bit more complex. Pitofsky predicts that treble-damage awards
would be a rarity among decisions of arbitrated antitrust claims.
Based on that prediction, he concludes that fewer suits would be
brought by private attorneys general against local and not too flagrant
violations which public agencies with limited budgets must ignore. It
is not clear that his prediction is sound, particularly if courts would
require re'cords to be made and decisions to be published whenever
antitrust claims were ordered to arbitration. But even if his prediction
were sound, it does not follow that fewer private antitrust claims would
be pressed. It is at least arguable that the lower costs and greater like-
lihood of success that might be associated with arbitration proceedings
would provide as much incentive to private action as treble-damages.
Had the Seventh Circuit come to the opposite conclusion in
Adtech it would have better effectuated the Arbitration Act and barred
some time consuming, strictly private vexatious antitrust suits from fed-
eral court. It should have done so.
MERGERS: THE "GENERAL DYNAMICS DEFENSE"
In a 1975 civil action, the United States Department of Justice
challenged the acquisition of a thirty-nine percent stock interest in Stei-
120. Indeed, in the seminal case, American Safety Equp. Corp. v. I.P Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968), the court suggested, "[lit is also proper to ask whether contracts of adhesion
between alleged monopolists and their customers should determine the forum for trying antitrust
violations." Id at 827.
121. See Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072 (1969).
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ger Tractor, Inc. by International Harvester as likely to substantially
lessen competition in both the production and the sale of high-powered
four-wheel-drive farm tractors throughout the nation. After a bench
trial, the district court found for the defendants 22 and the government
appealed. In United States v. International Harvester Co. 123 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the defendants had successfully proven two alter-
native theories to rebut the prima facie Clayton Act' 24 case against
them. The first theory was that due to Steiger's weak financial condi-
tion the past market shares upon which the government relied did not
paint a true picture of Steiger's ability to compete in the future. The
second was that other characteristics of the market simply made it un-
likely that competition would be substantially lessened. Acceptance of
the first theory constitutes an unwarranted departure from, while ac-
ceptance of the second theory is an economically sound application of,
the principles of section seven.
At trial the government showed that by virtue of the stock acquisi-
tion an undue percentage share of the relevant market was brought
under partly common control, resulting in a significant increase in con-
centration. The parties stipulated that the nationwide production and
sale of high-powered four-wheel-drive farm tractors were the relevant
markets within which to gauge the effects of the acquisition. In 1973,
the year preceding the acquisition, both markets were already concen-
trated with the top four firms controlling seventy-nine percent of the
production and seventy-four percent of the sales. The acquisition
brought together Steiger, the third largest producer and fourth largest
seller, 25 with International Harvester which ranked sixth in both mar-
kets. In 1973 Steiger accounted for sixteen percent of production and
seven percent of sales while International Harvester had seven percent
of production and eight percent of sales. By that showing alone, ac-
cording to United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,126 the govern-
ment established its prima facie case against the acquisition.
Pursuant to United States v. General Dynamics, 27 however, the
defendants sought to rebut the government's case. In General
Dynamics the government attacked the merger of two coal mining
companies each of which enjoyed a sizeable share of a concentrated
122. United States v. International Harvester Co., [1976] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,028 (N.D.
IM. Aug. 17, 1976), afl'd, 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
123. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
125. The reason for the discrepancy is that Steiger produced some tractors for sale by other
firms, including International Harvester. [19761 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 61,028 at 69,530-31.
126. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
127. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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market. The government proved that a small number of leading pro-
ducers dominated the coal mining industry; that there had been a trend
toward increasing concentration; and that the merger significantly en-
hanced the acquiring company's market share-enough to establish
prima facie illegality. Yet the Supreme Court upheld the merger. The
companies had demonstrated that coal was sold principally to utilities
on the basis of long-term contracts. Past production, therefore, was a
misleading index of competitive vigor. A better index was uncommit-
ted reserves of recoverable coal. Since the acquired firm had nearly
exhausted its reserves and was not in a position to replenish them, there
was in fact no substantial competition for the merger to lessen. Thus,
the "General Dynamics defense" was born.
To establish a General Dynamics defense the defendants intro-
duced evidence to prove that due to Steiger's weak financial condition,
its market share, like that of the acquired firm in General Dynamics,
overstated its future ability to compete. The health of Steiger's bal-
ance sheet in the years preceding the acquisition was anything but ro-
bust. In 1970 Steiger's assets, of which few were liquid, barely
exceeded its liabilities, and it suffered a net loss of more than one-half
million dollars on sales totalling almost three million dollars. 28 Its
condition was so precarious that its suppliers refused to ship parts and
components on credit. Management made efforts to correct some of
the company's most pressing problems and, on the strength of a manu-
facturing agreement with a Canadian cooperative, secured debt financ-
ing through Merchants National Bank of Fargo. Still, at the end of
1971, Steiger's liabilities substantially exceeded its assets, and its losses
had increased to more than $800,000 despite the doubling of sales. In
early 1972 Merchants National cut off the company's credit and ad-
vised its shareholders to sell the business. 29 Steiger remained afloat
by borrowing working capital from its customers, but its liabilities grew
faster than its assets. The only modest improvement it showed in 1972
was a reduction in its net loss. Not conventionally "bankable," Steiger
turned for financing to a commercial credit firm. The firm required
extensive collateral and Steiger's agreement to desist from certain cor-
porate activities without the firm's consent. Its interest rates were high.
For the first one and one-half million dollars in credit the firm charged
11 1/4 percent interest, almost twice the prime rate, and then for the
second one and one-half million dollars 15 1/2 percent, almost three
times the prime rate. At the close of fiscal 1973 Steiger's assets of
128. [1976] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,028 at 69,531.
129. Id
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$8,190,840 exceeded its liabilities of $7,081,518 and it reported a net
income of about one million dollars (about one-half of which resulted
from loss carry-forwards). But even being in the black in 1973 did not
change the fact that Steiger's financial condition was far worse than
any of the other seven firms in the industry for which figures were
available. 30 "[I]t could not withstand any economic adversities."'
3'1
It is certainly plausible that Steiger's weak financial condition impaired
its ability to compete, but proof of that condition did not establish d
General Dynamics defense. More should have been required. The ac-
quired coal producing company in General Dynamics was an insub-
stantial future competitor not only because it had exhausted its reserves
but also because it could not replace them. By analogy, the defendants
should have been required to prove not only Steiger's condition but
also that it could not be remedied.
They did not. The evidence adduced at trial showed that Steiger
"made numerous and repeated efforts, beginning as early as 1971, to
secure additional equity investment in the company through public and
private offerings of Steiger stock from virtually any source."'132 Some
of those who were approached made offers.
In fact, some financing was offered on substantially the same terms as
that offered by Harvester. For example, the investment banking
firm of Dain, Kalman & Quail ("DKQ") offered to raise $1 million
for Steiger by a private placement of common stock or convertible
subordinated debentures. When Steiger asked for a larger private
placement, DKQ proposed $2 - $3 million equity financing in Octo-
ber 1973. Although DKQ's price of $5 per share was the same that
[International] Harvester later paid, Steiger rejected it because at that
time Steiger felt the price was not high enough.'
33
Yet the defendants persuaded the district court that all offers were re-
jected because "the financing firms. . . wanted too much of the com-
pany for a small amount of equity."' 34 According to the district court,
Steiger reasonably concluded that International Harvester's offer of a
stock acquisition and manufacturing agreement was the "only practica-
ble source of sufficient amounts of equity financing to solve its pressing
needs." 135 One is left with the impression that the district court did not
think that Steiger's financial condition was remediless but only that In-
ternational Harvester's offer was the remedy least costly to those in
130. 564 F.2d at 775-76.
131. Id. at 776.
132. [1976] 2 TRADE CAs. (CCH) 61,028 at 69,531.
133. Brief for Appellant at 25, United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th
Cir. 1977).
134. [19761 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) $ 61,028 at 69,533.
135. Id
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control of Steiger. That was certainly the Seventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion for it held the district court's finding "fully supported by evidence
showing the onerous-options otherwise available to Steiger.' 36
The fact that among Steiger's financing options International Har-
vester's offer was accompanied by the fewest restrictions on managerial
prerogative or was least apt to dilute the value of existing shares, had
little, if any, bearing on the company's future ability to compete. Had
Steiger accepted an alternative offer it might not have been as profita-
ble to its principals but it could have continued as an independent force
in the market. Steiger's continued independent existence would have
made tacit collusion, the real danger against which section seven is
aimed, somewhat more difficult. By accepting the defendants' first re-
buttal theory, then, the Seventh Circuit subordinated the probable
harm from a likely lessening of competition to the very real gain for
Steiger's existing management and shareholders. The court was mis-
taken in doing so for the purpose of section seven is to protect competi-
tion, and not competitors,137 and certainly not those who happen to be
in control of a particular competitor.
138
Nevertheless, the court correctly upheld the merger for tacit collu-
sion in the relevant market appeared to be a rather remote possibil-
ity. 139 Increasing demand' 4° and the introduction of new products' 4'
would have made any understandings as to output or price extremely
difficult to police. Had any such understandings been reached, they
probably would have been disrupted by the entry of new firms and/or
expansion by regional ones.142 Certainly, the slight decline in concen-
tration,1 43 the change in market share rankings, 144 and the evidence of
price competition 45 were inconsistent with such understandings.
Moreover, the partial nature of the acquisition and the portions of the
Stock Purchase Agreement which provided that International Har-
vester shall not limit Steiger's efforts to sell its products to competitors
of International Harvester or to undertake other financially sound busi-
ness activities' 46 also minimized the danger of tacit collusion. This ev-
idence showed that the "concentration ratios, which can be unreliable
136. 564 F.2d at 779.
137. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
138. United States v. Amax, 402 F. Supp. 956, 971 (D. Conn. 1975).
139. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 47-77 (1976).
140. 564 F.2d at 770.
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indicators of actual market behavior, did not accurately depict the eco-
nomic characteristics of the . . . market."1 47 The defendants' second
theory established a proper General Dynamics defense and rebutted the
government's prima facie case.' 48 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was cor-
rect in affirming the district court's decision.
CONCLUSION
A close reading of the four major antitrust opinions authored dur-
ing the 1977-78 term by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit suggests that the court possesses no coherent antitrust
theory, no clear conception of the function of antitrust law. The
court's jurisprudential conundrum is perhaps best illustrated by its ap-
proval of the International Harvester/Steiger Tractor merger, a merger
which the government had proven presumptively harmful. In the
court's view, apparently, the merger's presumptive harms were either
outweighed by the benefits it would yield for Steiger's owners and man-
agers or rebutted by evidence that the chances for oligopolistic coordi-
nation in the production and sale of four-wheel-drive farm tractors
were small. It seems rather unlikely that those benefits and that evi-
dence could both be of genuine antitrust significance.
Lacking a firm policy direction, the court eschewed functional an-
titrust analysis in favor of the mechanical application of language from
some leading antitrust opinions. That approach led the court to the
correct disposition of a vertical territorial restraint claim in General
Beverage Sales Co. v. East Side Winery,' 49 but to unsatisfactory dispo-
sitions of tying and monopoly "misuse" claims in Sargent- Welch Scien-
t~ic Co. v. Ventron Corp.'50 and a non-arbitrability claim in Applied
Digital Technology, Inc. (Adtech) v. Continental Casualty Co.' 51 This
unimpressive record is not surprising. A literalistic legal methodology
is particularly dangerous in antitrust cases because antitrust opinions
are far too full of lay economic cliches, populist talismans, and ill-con-
sidered labels which serve only to mask antitrust policy.
147. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 631 (1974).
148. The United States argued that General Dynamics only permitted a section seven defend-
ant to rebut a prima facie case by showing that the market-share statistics gave an inaccurate
account of the acquisition's probable effects on competition. 564 F.2d at 773. In United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974), however, the Supreme Court seemed to read the
defense more broadly, as did the Seventh Circuit.
149. 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 8 to 31 supra.
150. 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977),petitionfor cert.fled, 46 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. May 1, 1978)
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